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THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME: INEXPERT
TESTIMONY AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Since 1962, legislatures and courts have actively attempted to develop
solutions to the problem of parental abuse and neglect of children. 1
Because child abuse 2 rarely occurs in the presence of witnesses, 3 provI. In 1962, a team of psychiatrists and other specialists published a now-famous and enormously influential study that first exposed the widespread nature of physical abuse of children
by their parents. KEMPE, SILVERMAN, STEELE, DROEGMUELLER, & SILVER, THE BATTERED-CHILD
SYNDROME, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BATTERED-CHILD SYNDROME]. The study
demonstrated that certain common classes of injuries to children were consistent with no other
cause but physical abuse by custodial adults. See generally id. at 21-23; Annot., 98 A.L.R.2D
306; McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1965); Note, Battered Child Syndrome-A Forensic Pathologist's Viewpoint, 28 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. I (1981). See also D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN, 1-48 (1970); Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies, 43 HARV. EDuc.
REV. 556-562 (1973). For example, during this period, all states enacted mandatory reporting
statutes, requiring doctors, teachers and other professionals to report suspected incidents of child
abuse to state agencies. I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW AND LEGISLATION 15, 17, 24-25
(1983). Nineteen states require such reporting "by any person" having knowledge or reason to
know. Id. at 17, 18, 24-25. Forty-five states impose a criminal penalty for failure to report.
Id. at 43-44. In addition, physicians and hospitals may be held liable for injuries sustained by
a child returned to her parents if medical personnel negligently failed to diagnose abuse. Landeros
v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399,551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). For discussion of the usual
content of state reporting statutes, see Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present,
A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes, 54 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 641 (1978); I. SLOAN, supra at 15-69.
2. The pitfalls of satisfactorily defining child abuse are well recognized. See generally Berger,
The Child Abusing Family (Pt I), 8 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY, Fall 1980, at 53, 55 [hereinafter
cited as Berger I]; D. GIL, supra note 1, at 35, 134-35; Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition,
8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729 (1975). State laws employ varied definitions, many of which rely on
parental fault. For example, Minnesota's reporting statute, defines "Physical Abuse" as "any
physical injury inflicted by a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the child's care
on a child other than by accidental means." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c); (West Supp.
1981). The same state's child protection statute, see infra note 10, does not define abuse, but
mandates court intervention upon a finding that a child is "neglected" or "dependent." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(10) (West 1982). An adjudication of dependence must be entered upon
a finding that the child is "without proper care because of the emotional . . . disability
. . . of his parent." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 269.015(10)(d) (West 1982). While the focus of the
reporting statute is on physical injury to the child, the adjudication of dependence may turn
on differing notions of "proper care." Because of the possibility of unfettered judicial discretion
in making such determinations, some commentators have proposed that all state intervention
be limited to cases of demonstrable physical harm. See, e.g., IJA-ABA JoINT CoMM'N ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981). See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
3. See, e.g., Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Minn. 1981) ("Most cases of felonious
assault tend to occur in a single episode, to which there are sometimes witnesses. By contrast,
cases that involve" 'battered child syndrome' occur in two or more episodes to which there are
seldom any witnesses.") For discussion of these and other evidentiary problems unique to child
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ing that a child was injured in a non-accidental manner has presented
the state with substantial problems. 4 A child's physical injuries may
leave little doubt that she has been beaten, neglected, or sexually
molested. 5 In the absence of witnesses, however, the state normally
must prove its case by showing that the injuries occurred while the
parent had exclusive control of the child. 6 This may be difficult to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
abuse proceedings, see generally Note, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J. 257 (1974) (noting lack of eyewitnesses, inability of child to testify due to
age, immaturity, fear, or unwillingness, and urging expanded use of existing evidentiary exceptions such as hearsay and evidence of prior acts of abuse) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Problems]. See also Note, Evidence-Child Abuse-Expert Medical Testimony Concerning "Battered
Child Syndrome" Held Admissible, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (1974) (tracing the history of the
battered child syndrome diagnosis and its acceptance by courts) [hereinafter cited as EvidenceChild Abuse].
4. See generally Note, Family Law-Parental Rights-Principles of Res Ipsa Loquitor Apply
to Proof of Child Abuse and Neglect, 9 TEX. TECH L. REY. 335 (Winter 1977-78) [hereinafter
cited as Principles); Note, Legislation-Child Protection Proceedings Under Article Ten of the
New York Family Court Act, 20 BUF. L. REV. 561 (1971); Evidentiary Problems, supra note
3, at 261.
5. For example, in State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981), the child's injuries, including multiple bruises, rib fractures, and hemorrhaging, were easily identified by the expert
witness as the result of physical beating. Id. at 61-62. It would appear that most prosecutions
for child abuse result from injuries so serious that the possibility of an accidental cause, typically
claimed by the defendant, is easily discounted. See also People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d
504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 15-16.
When child neglect or sexual abuse is charged, the physical evidence of the crime may be less
clear, although prosecutions likely occur only when the state has a strong case. The problem
of proof is most pronounced in civil abuse and neglect proceedings, where judges frequently
are called upon to order foster care or other coercive intervention without substantial physical
evidence of abuse. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.191 (West 1982), requiring a court to
intervene upon a finding that the child is neglected or dependent: the former defined in part
as "without proper parental care because of the faults or habits of his parent . . . , " MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10)(b) (West 1982), and the latter defined in part as "without proper
parental care because of the emotional, mental ... disability or ... immaturity of his parent,"
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(d) (West 1982). The broadness of such definitions may lead
a family court to enter a finding of dependency or neglect without evidence of any physical
harm. E.g., In re Wachlin, 309 Minn. 370, 373-74, 245 N.W.2d 183, 185 (1976) (affirming finding of neglect for handicapped child whose parents had refused to cooperate in efforts to provide
speech therapy.)
6. E.g., State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 411-412 (Utah 1978) (holding that because expert testimony
established that injuries were inflicted non-accidentally during a specific period of time, circumstantial evidence that the defendant had exclusive custody during that period was suffucient to sustain a conviction). In other cases, the defendant may not contest the obvious fact of exclusive
control. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981).The threshhold for sufficient
evidence of exclusive control is higher when more adults have contact with the child, and when
the timing of the injuries cannot be fixed with certainty. In addition, whenever the defendant
is charged with a crime in which premeditation or intent to kill is an element, sufficient circumstantial evidence may be more difficult to obtain. See generally Evidentiary Problems, supra
note 3, at 262.
7. For example, in State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978), the defendant contested his
conviction for manslaughter of his 20 month old stepson on grounds that a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence must exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, every other reasonable
hypothesis. Id. at 41 I. The court held that the defendant's undisputed custody of the child during a period of three and one half hours, and the expert witness's testimony that the injuries
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Family courts 8 in civil proceedings have responded to this situation
by relaxing some rules of evidence and creating a rebuttable presumption of abuse in the face of certain kinds of injuries. 9 In civil child
protection proceedings 10 the court determines whether a child is abused
or neglected, 11 and if so, determines custody of the child. Because child
protection proceedings are designed for the protection of children and
impose no criminal penalties on parents,i 2 commentators generally approve of these evidentiary changes. 13
had occurred during that time, were sufficient to permit a jury finding beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 412. Accord State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 281-82, 204 N. W.2d 404, 409-10 (1973).
8. The civil court empowered by statute to deal with family matters, especially child abuse
and neglect, is called in some states the "family court," in others the "juvenile court." E.g.,
N.Y. Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 2, 1011 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982) (empowering
family court to determine when the state may intervene to protect child); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 260.01, 260.111, 260.155, 260.191 (West 1982) (empowering juvenile court to adjudicate whether
child abused or neglected and to order best disposition consistent with child's welfare); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-301(a)(i)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1982) (granting juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over
"deprived" children). Jurisdiction does not extend to criminal prosecutions arising out of child
abuse. This Note will refer to the civil court charged with abuse and neglect jurisdiction as the
family court.
9. E.g., In re S., 46 Misc. 2d 161, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Fam. Ct. 1965) ("borrowing
from the evidentiary . . . principle of "res ipsa loquitor" and accepting the proposition that
the condition of the child speaks for itself, thus permitting an inference of neglect to be drawn
from proof of the child's age and condition, and that the latter is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if the parent who has the responsibility and control of an infant
is protective and non-abusive"). Several states have adopted this presumption by statute. E.g.,
N.Y. JuD. LAW § I046(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982). See generally Fraser, supra note
I, at 679-80; Principles, supra note 4; Evidentiary Problems, supra note 3, at 262-63.
10. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act is typical of state child protection legislation. MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 260.01-260, 301 (West 1982). Any reputable person may file a petition directing
the court to adjudicate the status of a child alleged to be neglected or dependent. Id. § 260. 13 I.
Typically, such a. petition is filed by the state agency charged with investigating reported incidents of abuse or neglect under the reporting statute, and with providing protective services.
Id. § 626.556(3), (10). The statute then provides for a two-step hearing procedure. In phase
one (adjudication), the juvenile court must determine whether the child in question meets the
statutory definition of "dependent" or "neglected." Id. §§ 260.155(1), 260.015(6)(d) ("Dependent child": without proper parental care because of emotional or mental disability or immaturity
of parent); 260.015(10) ("Neglected child": without proper care because of faults or habits of parent
or without necessary care due to parental neglect). If the court has found the child to be dependent
or neglected, the court in phase two (disposition) enters whichever of several authorized orderswill be in the child's "best interests." Id. § 260.19l(l)(a)-(c) (including home supervision and
transfer of custody). In a separate proceeding, the juvenile court also is authorized to terminate
parental rights on a showing of neglect or abuse that is likely to continue in the future to the
permanent detriment of the child. Id. § 260.221(4). See generally I. SLOAN, supra note I, at
18-22, 50-53, 75-76, 79-80, 127-35.
11. For simplicity's sake, this Note will refer to all child maltreatment as "child abuse,"
and to all legal proceedings, civil and criminal, arising out of alleged abuse as "child abuse
proceedings." When it is necessary to distinguish, civil proceedings will be designated "child
protection proceedings," and criminal actions "child abuse prosecutions."
12. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text; Fraser, supra note I, at 670.
13. E.g., Fraser, supra note I, at 679-80; Principles, supra note 4, at 342; Evidentiary Problems, supra, note 3, at 273; Evidence-Child Abuse, supra note 3, at 941-42. But see Note,
Evidence, Child Abuse-Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: What Protection is
Left After Grabill v. State, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 769, 783-85 (1981) (arguing against ad-
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The lack of eyewitness evidence is no less acute in criminal
prosecutions 14 than in child protection proceedings, and proof that the
parent caused the injuries inevitably must come from circumstantial
evidence. 15 Accordingly, appellate courts generally refuse to reverse convictions for child homicide, even in the face of arguably prejudicial
evidence, 16 where other substantial evidence supports the conviction. 11
The difficulty of proving child abuse, combined with a perceived
willingness of courts to admit otherwise excludable evidence, 18 has led
some state prosecutors to attempt to introduce evidence that the defendant parent possesses character traits identifying her with the "battering parent syndrome." 19 Such testimony is introduced to suggest that
because this parent fits the psychological and demographic profile of
typical abusing parents, she is more likely to be guilty of the particular
acts of abuse charged. 20 Some courts have ruled such testimony inadmissible as character evidence. 21 Yet the courts indicate that the battering parent syndrome may be admissible in future cases, given a showing of sufficient scientific accuracy and predictive value. 22 Because of
milting evidence of instances of past abusive conduct in a criminal proceeding) [hereinafter cited

What Protection?]."
14. The very proposition that the criminal law is a helpful aspect of the child protection
system has been attacked, primarily on the ground that it may interfere with effective treatment,
and thus impede the protective function of the child protection statutes. See e.g., DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT, v.l, 29, 31-32 (DHEW Pub. No. 75-30073) (1975);
Helfer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physician, in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED
CHILD, 25, 33-36 (2d. Ed. 1974); Editor's Note, HELFER & KEMPE, at 186-87. But see Collins,
The Role of the Law Enforcement Agency, in HELFER & KEMPE, at 179-186.
Since the criminal law is less well-equipped than civil child protection statutes to provide continuing protection of children, the entire case for criminal jurisdiction over abusing parents seems
to rest on its deterrent function. The deterrence theory is deprived of some force, however, by
the limited possibility of apprehension and prosecution for child abuse falling short of homicide,
due to parental control over children. Therefore, many observers argue that criminal prosection
of abusing parents ought to be limited to the most egregious cases of physical harm, primarily
homicide. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LITIGATION: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, 142-46 (1981).
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
20. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983) (finding that the profile
"could lead a reasonable juror to no other inference than that the state was implying that this
parent had a history of violent behavior, and, more important, that this parent fit within the
syndrome, and had in fact murdered her baby").
21. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d
58, 64 (Minn. 1981); see also FED. R. Evm. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion.); accord 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. Evm. (404)(a) (West 1980);
cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1981) (The general character of the parties . . . [is) irrelevant
matter . . . ").
22. See State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d at 64 ("We feel this finding is required until further
evidence of the scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or profile diagnosis can be
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the syndrome's conflict with the character evidence rule, its future admissibililty will require an explicit exception to that rule. Such an exception, although advancing the strong ·state policy of eradicating child
abuse, 23 would infringe upon the competing interests of defendant
parents in a fair adjudication. 24 The important family and societal interests at stake whenever the state attempts to intervene in the parentchild relationship call for scrupulous accuracy in decision-making. An
exception to the character evidence rule for the battering parent syndrome would deprive parents of a protection against prejudicial decisionmaking that the law considers significant enough to grant to all other
defendants. 25 These overriding policies mandate that no such exception be created.
·
This Note proposes that courts refuse to give further consideration
to admitting the battering parent syndrome as evidence in both civil
and criminal proceedings arising out of child abuse. Part I of the Note
describes the syndrome as it appears in the psychological literature.
Part II suggests that current judicial attitudes favor the future admissibility of the syndrome, conditioned only on an improved showing of scientific accuracy. Part III demonstrates that regardless of scientific accuracy, the character evidence rule forbids courts from admitting the battering parent syndrome. Part IV argues that the important
policies underlying the character evidence rule override the asserted
need for an exception to that rule for the battering parent syndrome
in child abuse proceedings.
I.

THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME: DEFINITION

The battering parent syndrome does not appear in the medical
literature as a diagnosable mental disorder. 26 Instead, a profile of
psychological and demographic characteristics that many experts consider typical of abusing parents emerges from numerous psychiatric
established"); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70,303 S.E.2d at 16 n.3 (expert "attempted no showing
of [the profile's] scientific validity."); cf. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780
(1983) (finding no showing of "how, when, or where the doctor . . . acquired his expertise
on the profile of the battered child's parent . . . ").
23. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 101-127 and accompanying text. While it may be argued that extensive
state intervention interferes with a sort of parental "proprietary" right to discipline children
however they see fit, this Note takes the position that the law protects no such right. Rather,
parental "rights" are conceived of as necessary correlatives to parental "duties" adequately to
care for their children; the rights terminate when the parent's abusive behavior violates those
duties. See generally Fraser, The Child and His Parents: A Delicate Balance of Rights, in R.
HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, 315 (1976);
Note, Choosingfor Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 172-73 (1983); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES§§ 616-617.
25. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
26. Unlike the battered child syndrome, which is a recognized medical diagnosis, see, e.g.,·
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and psychological studies. The major characteristics that compose this
profile are generally the same, 21 although the psychiatric and
psychological studies which have isolated characteristics have used varied
methodologies. 28 Thus, abusing parents seem to have low self esteem, 29
poor impulse control, 30 low empathy, 31 low frustration tolerance, 32 and
inadequate knowledge of basic child development and of parenting
skills. 33 In addition, they are more likely than non-abusers to manifest
Battered Child Syndrome, supra note I, the battering parent syndrome does not appear in the
medical literature as such, although a number of studies are in agreement about characteristics
of abusive parents. See infra notes 27-39. Similarly, the psychiatric profession does not recognize
the battering parent syndrome as such. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM Ill).
27. Although testimony considered by courts contains no direct disagreement, it is apparent
that experts draw their conclusions from personal clinical experience, as well as from the existing
psychological literature. Variation exists in the factors which experts cite in their testimony. For
example, in Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983) the expert described parents
who abuse a child in a life-threatening fashion as parents who were abused as children, and
who as adults suffer from chronic environmental stress. The parents' inability to cope with stress
causes impulsive or explosive behavior. Id. at 16. In another case, testimony described characteristics
of the abusing parent as including role reversal, low empathy, short fuse, low temper, short
temper, low boiling point, high blood pressure, strict authoritarianism, uncommunicativeness,
low self-esteem, isolation, lack of trust. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-63 (Minn. 1981).
The expert in the only other recent case to consider explicitly the battering parent profile indicated that abusing parents:
often are young, somewhat immature, unable to really handle their emotions in a socially
acceptable fashion. Frequently they are in a stressful situation, either economic, [or)
domestic stresses on them, and subject to sort of flying off when certain added stress
is presented. They sometimes have been victims of quite harsh punishment themselves
as they were growing up, . . . a pattern which they fall back into.
Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 779 (1983).
28. The studies differ significantly in methodology. Several involve clinical observation of
abusive parents, performed without the experimental controls necessary to generalize the results
to all parents. See, e.g., Steele & Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Their
Children, in HELFER & KEMPE, supra note 24, at 92-93. Clinical studies rely heavily on
.psychoanalytic concepts which are not universally accepted among mental health professionals.
Id. For several profiles of abusing parents drawn by clinicians, see generally D. Gil, supra note
I, at 24-25. Even experimental studies use different definitions of child abuse and neglect or
different standards for selecting abusing and "normal" parents. See Berger I, supra note 2, at
55; D. GIL, supra note I, at 35, 134. Some studies assess parents' attitudes or personality through
parents' responses to questions. See, e.g., Milner & Wimberly, Prediction and Explanation of
Child Abuse, 36 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 875 (1980). This technique has been criticized by other
researchers. See, e.g., Berger, The Child Abusing Family (Pt II), 8 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY, Winter
1980, at 52, 63-65 [hereinafter cited as Berger II].
29. E.g., Friedrich & Wheeler, The Abusing Parent Revisited: A Decade of Psychological
Research, 170 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 577,583 (1982) (summarizing the psychological
literature on abusive parents since 1972) [hereinafter cited as Friedrich]; Berger, I, supra note
2, at 58; Berger II, supra note 26, at 63 (noting that this characteristic has been found by the
more methodologically sound studies).
30. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2, at 58; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583, 585.
31. E.g., Berger II, supra note 28, at 63; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583.
32. E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 582, 583, 585 (calling attention to a "stress-heightening
attributional process," through which abusive parents are more easily irritated by child behaviors
than non-abusers); B. STEELE, WORKING WITH ABUSIVE PARENTS FROM A PSYCHIATRIC POINT OF
Vrnw, 26-27 (1975).
33. E.g., Twentyman & Plotkin, Unrealistic Expectations of Parents Who Maltreat Their
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diagnosable psychopathology, or other serious emotional problems. 34
Apart from such personality characteristics, abusing parents in the
reported studies were themselves almost universally abused or neglected
as children. 35 As adults, they tend to social isolation, 36 and are likely
to be under environmental stress, 37 often belonging to lower socioeconomic groups. 38 Finally, clinical studies agree that abusing parents,
themselves emotionally starved for acceptance and affection, frequently
reverse roles with their children, asking from them maturity and support that the children are incapable of providing. 39
This profile, with minor variations, has been introduced as evidence
in child abuse proceedings. Every court to consider the profile so far
has rejected it. The uncertainty of these rejections, however, portends
future admissibililty.
II.

CURRENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BATTERING PARENT
SYNDROME: THE POSSIBILITY

OF FUTURE ADMISSIBILITY

A profile of the typical abusing parent could be of great value to
Children, 38 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 501 (1982). Earlier studies were inconclusive on whether
abusive parents actually had poorer knowledge of child development and parenting skills. See,
e.g., Friedrich, supra note 29 at 579, 585. Abusing parents were thought to be more likely to
have unrealistically high expectations for the physical and mental ages of their children. E.g.,
Steele & Pollock, supra note 28, at 96, (utilizing clinical observation of abusing parents). But
see Kravitz and Driscoll, Expectations for Childhood Development among Child-Abusing and
Non-Abusing Parents, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 336 (1983) (finding no differences in expectation between the two groups). Twentyman & Plotkin found that abusive parents were more
likely both to over and underestimate their childrens' developmental capacities, suggesting that
inadequate parental knowledge may be a better predictor of abusive behavior than high expectations, supra at 501-03.
34. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2 at 57; Steele_& Pollock, supra note 28 at 94-97.
35. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2, at 59-61; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 577-78; Jayartne,
Child Abusers as Parents and Children: A Review, 22 SOCIAL WORK, 5 (1977); Steele & Pollock,
supra note 28 at 97-98. While this cross-generational hypothesis that child abuse repeats itself
has received much empirical support, most of the reviews note that disagreements over the definition
of child abuse and other methodological concerns make such results suspect. Such results are
also difficult to explain because of the absence of research support for a causal connection between childhood experience and adult behavior. Friedrich, supra note 29, at 579. Nevertheless,
this characteristic is probably the best accepted of all in the literature on characteristics of abusing parents.
36: E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 582-83.
37. E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583-85; Conger, Burgess & Barrett, Child Abuse Related
to Life Change and Perceptions of Illness, 28 FAMILY CooRDINATOR, 73 (1979); Justice & Duncan, Life Crisis as a Precursor to Child Abuse, 91 Pusuc HEALTH I JO (1976).
38. E.g., D. GIL, supra note I, at 117; Serrano, Zuelzer, Howe & Reposa, Ecology of Abusive
and Nonabusive Families, 2 ADVANCES FAMILY PSYCHIATRY 183 (1980). But see Steele & Pollock,
supra note 28 at 92-93 (noting that abusers in their study came from all socioeconomic classes,
but acknowledging that their haphazard selection process prevents this finding from rising to
a level of reliable proof); Berger II, supra note 28, at 60-61 (noting that environmental stress
frequently is confounded with low socioeconomic status in the studies, rendering unwarranted
any conclusion regarding causation).
39. E.g., Steele & Pollock, supra note 28 at 94-95; Kempe & Kempe, Assessing Family
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the state in a child abuse proceeding. 4 ° For example, following expert
presentation of the profile, a witness familiar with the defendant could
testify that the defend ant posesses one or more of the characteristics
identified by the expert. 4 1 Alternatively, the expert could offer an opinion that the defendant "fit" the profile. In either event, the state would
gain the significant advantage of suggesting that because of her
psychological make-up, this defendant shows a statistical likelihood
of being a child abuser. 42
Courts justifiably have been troubled by the implications of permitting use of the battering parent syndrome to prove child abuse, and
to date, uniformly have forbidden its admission. Several reasons have
been advanced for rejecting the syndrome, including general irrelevancy43
and likelihood of prejudice outweighing probative value. 44 A plurality
of opinions, however, exclude the battering parent syndrome for its
conflict with the explicit dictates of the character evidence rule. 45 This
common law rule, now adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence, proPathology, in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, 118-19 (1976).
40. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Kempe & Kempe, Assessing Family Pathology,
in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, 118-19
(1976).
41. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1981) (former case worker testifies
that defendant was abused as a child and has a short temper). In one case, no corroborating
witnesses were called, but the court held that it was error (though not reversible error) to permit
the prosecutor to argue to the jury that the defendant fit the environmental stress component
of the syndrome. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 779-80 (1983).
42. The studies described supra notes 26-39 compare the psychological profiles of known
child abusers with non-abusing parents. The characteristics reported in those studies have been
shown reliably to distinguish between those two groups.
However, the mental health experts disagree about whether instruments developed through
studies of known abusers can be reliably adapted for predictive use. One study reported very
poor results from such an attempt. Milner & Ayoub, Evaluation of "At Risk" Parents Using
the Child Abuse Potential Inventory, 36 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 945, 947 (1980) (using a diagnostic
instrument that had discriminated reliably between known abusers and non-abusers in earlier
research, the authors found that the instrument successfully classified only 45% of mothers judged
"at-risk" by clinical observers). These results may be explained in part by the choice of "at
risk" criteria, which included virtually every psychological characteristic found linked to child
abuse in past research. Id. at 946. Different results might have been obtained with a smaller
number of generally accepted characteristics of abusing parents.
This Note assumes that the available psychological research, while not conclusive, provides
sufficient information to permit a mental health professional reliably to identify a parent likely
to neglect or abuse. This identification would be made on the basis of some combination of
clinical observation, testing, and extrinsic evidence about life history, life circumstances (e.g.,
marital and socieoeconomic status) and behavior. Whether this type of identification is sufficiently accurate to be admitted by courts is considered infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
43. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (arguing that similarity to
a psychological profile simply has no tendency to show the defendent's guilt for a particular crime).
44. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (holding that the prejudicial
impact of associating the defendant with a profile in a rape prosecution substantially outweighed
any probative value of the evidence).
45. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1983); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d
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hibits the state from raising the issue of the defendant's character to
prove that she "acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion. " 46 Courts employing this analysis conclude that the battering parent syndrome could have no purpose or effect except to imply
to the jury that the defendant possessed a propensity for child abuse,
and therefore is more likely to have committed the particular abuse
charged. 47
Despite this apparent conflict with the explicit language of the
character evidence rule, the courts have refused to foreclose future admissibility of the battering parent syndrome. Indeed, the courts appear to be most troubled not by the character evidence rule's concern
with unfair prejudice to the defendant, 48 but by their uncertainty about
the scientific accuracy of the syndrome. A greater showing of scientific accuracy and reliability of the syndrome, courts imply, will result
in its acceptance in future cases. 49 The opinions relying on the character
evidence rule seem almost to invite more extensive efforts by prosecutors
to establish the scientific accuracy of the syndrome. 50
Current judicial analysis of the evidentiary inadequacies of the battering parent syndrome thus provides at best uneasy protection for
parents charged with child abuse. This refusal to shut the door to the
battering parent syndrome appears especially troubling in light of courts'
traditional liberalilty in ruling on admissibility of evidence in child abuse
proceedings. 51 Likewise, in child protection proceedings, similar evidence
on enumerated characteristics of a parent's mental state currently is
58, 64 (Minn. 1981). Loebach distinguished two earlier Minnesota cases, State v. Loss, 295 Minn.
271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973) (permitting evidence that defendant fit the battering parent syndrome when such evidence was offered without objection), and State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn.
401, 246 N.W.2d 12 (1976) (holding that admission of such evidence, not indispensible to the
state's case, did not constitute reversible error). Despite their statements that the battering parent
syndrome constitutes inadmissible character evidence, none of the courts considering such evidence
(Duley, Sanders, Loebach, and Goblirsch) have found reversible error.
46. FED. R. Evm. 404(a).
47. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E. 2d 13, 18 (1983) (finding that the profile "could
lead a reasonable juror to no other inference than that the State was implying that this parent
had a history of violent behavior, and, more important, that this parent fit within the syndrome,
and had in fact murdered her baby"); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1982) ("The
obvious purpose for the introduction of the . . . character evidence was to demonstrate that
appellant fit within the 'battering parent' profile"); cf. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287,
667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983). While basing its holding on the likelihood that testimony on the
characteristics of statutory rape offenders would be more prejudicial than probative, the court
explained its reasoning in terms of propensity evidence concerns. "Such evidence invites a jury
to conclude that because the defendant has been identified ... as a member of a group having
a higher incidence of child sexual abuse, it is more likely that the defendant committed the crime."
48. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 22.
50. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 18 n.7 (noting specifically
that the issue of scientific accuracy was not decided because no attempt had been made to establish
accuracy).
51. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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admissible in the adjudication phase. 52 Exclusion of the battering parent
syndrome flows against this tide. Such exclusion will continue only
if courts express more clearly and with greater certainty the reasons
for the exclusion. This Note suggests a framework for continued exclusion, arguing that both existing rules of evidence and overriding
policy considerations preclude admissibililty.
Ill.

INADMISSIBILILTY OF THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME
UNDER EXISTING RULES OF EVIDENCE

Admission of testimony concerning the battering parent syndrome
presents at least two evidentiary problems; the quality of the scientific
support for the syndrome and the conflict with the character evidence
rule. Part A of this Section measures the syndrome's scientific accuracy
against the general requirements for relevancy of expert testimony, and
concludes that the unique nature of the psychological profile prevents
the syndrome from qualifying as relevant evidence. Part B argues that
even if the syndrome is thought to be relevant, the character evidence
rule still prohibits its admissibility.

A.

Relevancy

The modern trend in determining whether evidence is relevant, and
therefore admissible, 53 is to set a very low threshhold. The Federal Rules
define as relevant evidence "having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 54
52. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015(6) (10) (West 1982) (defining "Dependent Child"
with regard to the "emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of his parent
... " (6); and "Neglected Child" as a child "without proper parental care because of the faults
or habits of his parent ... " (10)). While a broad reading of these mental characteristics could
permit evidence of the battering parent syndrome as an "emotional" or "mental disability,"
it should be clear that the syndrome is not itself a disability, but rather a description of several
mental traits, only some of which are themselves disabilities. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. While most states permit court-ordered psychological examination of a parent in
evidence at the dispositional phase of a child protection proceeding, some states permit such
evidence at the adjudicatory phase. See Fraser, supra note 1, at 669-70 (1978). A forced examination is tantamount to forcing a parent to testify against himself. Id. at 670. While this
may present no constitutional problems, since the proceedings are not criminal, loss of custody
of a child surely has a punitive dimension. Id. at 670 n.183. See also infra notes 114-117 and
accompanying text. To the extent that any such psychological testimony suggests a propensity
for abuse or neglect it necessarily relies on existing battering parent profiles.
53. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. RULE 402 (West 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-201 (5744) (1981) ("[E]vidence must
relate to the questions being tried by the jury and bear upon them either directly or indirectly.
Irrelevant matter should be excluded.").
54. FED. R. Evm. 401.
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If possession of a number of characteristics shared by most abusing
parents makes it more probable that the possessor is herself an abusing parent, the battering parent syndrome would satisfy this threshhold
requirement.
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the scientific community's
acceptance of the battering parent syndrome. The decision to admit
any expert testimony is made by the trial judge, 55 based on evidence
that the testimony reflects a position which is "generally accepted"
in the relevant scientific community. Appellate courts have limited their
review of decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony to this requirement of general acceptance. 56 As illustrated in Section I of this Note,
researchers have accumulated sufficient evidence to show broad agreement on a number of characteristics composing the battering parent
syndrome.
Even if it meets the "general acceptance" criteria of the expert
testimony requirement, however, the battering parent syndrome will
still be inadmissible unless those agreed-upon characteristics tend meaningfully to show that this particular defendant committed the acts
charged. 57 In fact, the syndrome does no more than establish that when
known child abusers are compared with non-abusing parents, members
of the former group more frequently exhibit certain psychological traits
and demographic characteristics than members of the latter. 58 Compared with the general population of parents, then, parents exhibiting
the battering parent syndrome are statistically more likely to be child
abusers. The question is whether such a statistical correlation renders
the parent's guilt "more probable . . . than it would be without the
evidence."
55. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert ... may testify thereto ... "); U.S. v. Gavic, 520 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1975)
("[A]dmissibility of expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge."); Duley
v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983).
56. In Sanders, the court explicitly noted that the clinical psychologist's testimony about the
features of the battering parent syndrome lacked a showing of "scientific validity." Sanders
v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3 (1983). The court seems to be referring to
the common law requirement that expert testimony may be admitted only if the scientific principle has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye continues to be cited as good law, e.g., State
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028, 1033-34 (1983) (holding that the use of hypnosis to
refresh witnesses' memories lacks reliabilit.y judged by the standards of :he rel"!vant scientific
community, and noting that Frye still constitutes the majority rule); United States v. Lewellyn,
723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing
of insanity because he failed "to demonstrate that there is general acceptance in the fields of
psychiatry and psychology of the principle that some pathological gamblers lack substantial capacity
to conform their conduct to the requirements of laws ... "). The language of the new federal
rule appears broader, permitting experts to base opinion upon facts or data "reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field." FED. R. Evm. 703.
57. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 42.
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In a very crude sense, the answer to this inquiry might appear to
be yes. The law frequently permits proof of causation by a showing
of statistical likelihood, as when an expert testifies that a construction
worker has contracted cancer from working with asbestos. The defendant is free to propose other ex"planations, or to attack the statistical
foundation of the conclusion, but the evidence is admissible because
it makes the theory of causation more probable than it would be without
the doctor's testimony. 59
In contrast, it is not clear that the correlation between psychological
characteristics and abuse represented by the battering parent syndrome
actually tends to show a propensity for abuse in this parent. The law
traditionally has taken a skeptical view of the value of psychological
profile evidence, admitting it for only limited purposes. 60 Some commentators suggest that the psychologist's ability to predict behavior
accurately on the basis of even accepted diagnoses is so primitive that
all psychological testimony should be excluded from courts. 61 Accordingly, absent a statutory mandate, 62 courts have limited the admission
of testimony on the mental state of a party largely to child custody
59. Such evidence, however, may not be sufficient to support a finding of liability. See generally
R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, 152-54 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as LEMPERT & SALTZBURG). Evidence is not excludable on relevancy grounds merely because
standing alone it would be insufficient to support a verdict. If the state's case is thought of
as a "wall," each piece of evidence is a "brick" necessary to the construction of the wall. Id.
at 151-52.
60. Commentators have argued, without much success, for expansion of the role of profile
evidence, especially in civil cases. See, e.g., McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 189 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (suggesting that prohibition of evidence of "accident proneness" on
the issue of auto negligence has a doubtful connection to the character evidence rule, and suggesting that courts keep abreast of the changing state of the art of this sort of prediction) [hereinafter
cited as McCORMICK]; Maloney & Reish, The Accident-Prone Driver: The Automobile Ages Biggest Unsolved Problem, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 364, 381-382 (1962) (suggesting that a profile of
habits, psychomotor characteristics and mental characteristics might be a valid basis for restricted
issuance of licenses). McCormick reports that as of 1978, no court had accepted such evidence
in a negligence suit. McCORMICK§ 189 (Supp. 1978). See also Note, The Medical Practice Computer Profile: Proof of the Doctor's Actions in a Series of Similar Cases, 7 U.C.D. L. REV.
523, 527 (1974) (arguing for admissiblity in a medical malpractice action of a computer composite of a doctor's records as proof of the quality of care he generally provides). But see Johnson
v. Myers, 118 Ga. App. 773, 165 S.E.2d 739 (1968) (rejecting such evidence).
61. See generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 735-39 (1974). But see Litwack, Gerber & Fenster,
The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269, 282-93 (1979)
(arguing that despite the difficulties with psychiatric diagnosis, psychologists and psychiatrists
may perform several valuable functions for a court, including discovering and analyzing parent
attitudes and behaviors relevant to a custody disposition).For an engaging fictional speculation
on the potential for psychology accurately to predict human behavior, see generally I. ASIMOV,
FOUNDATION (1951).
62. For example, some state statutes require an estimation of the "dangerousness" of a party
in a proceeding for civil commitment or criminal sentencing. See generally Mullen & Reinehr,
Predicting Dangerousness of Maximum Security Forensic Mental Patients, IO J. PSYCHIATRY
L. 223, 228 (1982) (reporting poor correlations of both psychological tests and demographic data
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disputes 63 and criminal defenses. 64 This restricted admission of testimony
on mental state reflects the law's compromise with the necessity of
obtaining some knowledge, however imperfect, in order to determine
the best placement for the child or the mens rea of an accused. The
necessity that moves courts to depart from the general practice of
precluding psychological testimony is absent in situations in which the
court might be asked to admit testimony about the battering parent
syndrome. Psychological testimony is at its strongest when used to prove
or disprove insanity, since it is limited to showing merely that the defendant possesses certain thinking processes. A court cannot determine the
culpabililty of a criminal defendant claiming insanity without hearing
opinions on whether the defendant's psychological profile fits that
generally associated with a mental disorder. In contrast, a court need
not examine the psychological characteristics of a parent to make the

with expert estimates of "dangerousness"); Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy
·of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in Law and Psychiatry, I J. PSYCHIATRY
L. 409,421 (1973) (concluding that the·N.Y. statute had led to psychiatric conclusions and recommendations based on the charges levelled rather than on any additional evidence of dangerous
behavior). While the criticisms levelled by both articles may be justified, they are inapplicable
to the use of the battering parent syndrome. First, sentencing of criminals occurs only after
conviction, and thus bears analogy to the dispositional phase of a child protection proceeding.
At that point, whatever predictions of future behavior are available, even if only minimally reliable,
• will support the important policy of protecting the child (or the public). Second, the use of
psychiatric testimony in both sentencing of a criminal and placement of an abused child does
not conflict with the prohibitions of the character evidence rule, because the rule does not apply
when character is an "essential element" of the issue before the court. FED. R. Evm. 404(a),
advisory committee note.
63. Once a child has been adjudicated "abused" or "neglected," the court has no alternative
but to consider which parent, if either, should have custody. Even if most child custody statutes
did not mandate consideration of parental fitness, see supra note 10, it is difficult to imagine
how a judge would determine which placement would be in the "best interests" of the child
without it. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN§§ 257.025, 260.011 (West, 1978) (requiring the family
court to order placement of children in accord with "best interests" or "spiritual [and) emotional ... welfare," in any custody proceeding or abuse and neglect disposition). Nonetheless,
with a few exceptions, states have carefully limited the use of a psychological study of the parent's
propensity for future abuse to the disposition of a custody dispute, when the issue of parental
fitness is unavoidably before the court. See Fraser, supra note I, at 669-70.
64. The psychological profile of a criminal defendant becomes essential once the defendant
has raised the defense of insanity. Yet even in this well-recognized area, skepticism about the
validity of psychiatry and psychology creates constant pressure to eliminate or modify the defense.
See generally Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77 (1982). In addition, courts have been wary of expanding the justification of self-defense to include proof by psychological profile that a woman charged with killing
her husband was a victim of the battered woman syndrome. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981) (rejecting such evidence in part for failure to show
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Wyo. 1981). Cf. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 640 (D.C. 1979) (remanding for
determination of whether the battered woman syndrome meets the general acceptance standard);
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.
1982) (remanding for same). But see State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73
(1980) (permitting such evidence).
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factual determination of whether she did, or did not, abuse her child. 65
Possession of the psychological characteristics of the battering parent
syndrome is relevant only insofar as it suggests the parent's propensity
to behave in an abusive way, a conclusion that must rest on psychology's
predictive rather than descriptive value. 66
Courts take the position that the uncertainty that characterizes
psychology's abililty to predict behavior warrants concluding that
psychological profiles do not make the existence of the "fact" of
behavior "more probable ... than it would be without the evidence. " 61
Absent an overriding necessity such as the determination of insanity,
courts should follow this general pattern by excluding the battering
parent syndrome on this ground of irrelevancy.

B.

Character Evidence

Even if courts conclude that the general scientific acceptance of its
components renders the statistical likelihood suggested by the batter-.
ing parent syndrome sufficiently relevant to warrant admissibility, the
syndrome must nevertheless be excluded because of its conflict with
the character evidence rule. 6 :
The traditional and modern rules of evidence squarely support the
conclusion that the battering parent syndrome, as established by expert and corroborative testimony, constitutes character evidence. 69
Wigmore-described character as "a person's disposition - i.e. a trait,
65. With limited statutory exceptions, such an inquiry is precluded until the dispositional
phase of a child protection proceeding. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
66. Cf. supra notes 42, 61. Child custody determinations rely on exactly this predictive function, but are justified in such reliance by a statutory scheme that requires an initial determination
that abuse has occurred, before attempting to predict the best placement for the child. E.g. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.191 (West 1980). Once the fact of abuse has been determined, the law has
a strong interest in securing a safe placement for the child. To this end, courts are empowered
to consider otherwise inadmissible information at the dispositional hearing, since the need for
some means of predicting outweighs the questionable quality of such predictions. E.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN.§ 260.181(2) (West 1980) (permitting court to consider "any other information deemed
material").
67. FED. R. Evm. 401.
68. See supra note 21.
69. Id. None of the reported cases have considered whether an expert would be permitted
to examine the defendant and make a "diagnosis" that she was afflicted with the battering parent
syndrome, or otherwise offer an opinion that this parent has a propensity to abuse. If the American
Psychiatric Association were to determine that the battering parent syndrome were a medically
diagnosible condition, and to add the syndrome to DSM-III, supra note 26, courts would be
presented with a very different question. At that point, the expert's opinion would resemble
a typical psychiatric opinion on mental capacity. Nevertheless, if offered for the purpose of showing
that because her mental condition included a propensity to abuse, the defendant had in fact
committed the abuse charged, the character evidence objection would still exist. While recognizing that a "diagnosis" of battering parent syndrome would present a much clearer conflict between the character evidence rule and the judge's normal discretion to admit expert testimony,
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or group of traits, or the sum of his traits." 10 Such evidence may not
be used to prove liability for a particular act by suggesting the defendant' s general propensity to commit such an act. 11 The battering parent
syndrome fits this definition of character evidence. When the state attempts to show that the parent resembles the expert witness's portrait
of character traits by calling lay witnesses, the testimony of such
witnesses always describes particular traits. For example, in one case,
the state called witnesses who testified that as an adolescent, the defendant had exhibited poor control of his temper, social isolation and
low tolerance for frustration, 12 three of the characteristics of the battering parent profile. 73 Without testimony that the defendant possesses
those traits that comprise the syndrome, testimony on the traits
themselves would be irrelevant. Since it is only by suggesting the impermissible inference of guilt by propensity that the syndrome has any
relevance, it plainly conflicts with the character evidence rule.
Evidence of propensity is relevant to the likelihood of the defendant's guilt or liability for particular acts, 74 as subsequent courts,
Wigmore, and other commentators universally acknowledge. They also
agree, however, that the possibility of a jury finding guilt or liability
based on the belief that the defendant is a "bad" or "undesirable"
person, rather than on proof that she committed the particular acts
charged, requires a per se exclusion of all such evidence. 15 This consee supra note 53, this Note assumes that such a "diagnosis" standing alone should likewise
be excluded as "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character." FED. R. Evro. 404(a).
70. IA J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 52 (Tillers rev. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE].
71. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a).
72. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1981).
73. See supra notes 30, 32, 36.
74. Evidence of propensity would not necessarily be sufficient to support a finding of guilt
or liability. See supra note 59.
75. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 70, §§ 55, 57; McCORMICK supra note 60, at§§ 188, 190.
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative
value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Michelson v. United States 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). But see Lempert and Saltzburg, who
argue that guilty defendants with past records are likely to plea bargain to avoid trial, due to
the variety of exceptions to the character evidence rule permitted for past bad acts; that defendants with past records who do go to trial are more likely to be innocent; and that police work
is organized so that persons mistakenly charged are likely to have criminal records. LEMPERT
& SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 217 n.45, 237. This argument has some force in the child abuse
area, since abusive parents, while unlikely to have prior convictions for child abuse crimes (if
they still have custody of children), may have past records with child welfare departments which
may be admissible to show motive, intent, modus operandi, or for other non-propensity purposes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 404(b) (West 1978). See infra note 94. For example, if
a jury were to find a defendant guilty of child abuse because of his reputation as an alcoholic,
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cern for the danger of unfair prejudice provides the theoretical foundation for the character evidence rule. Prejudice has been defined as
"harm which results when evidence is inappropriately influential because
it appeals to the biases or emotions of the fact finder. " 16 Thus, evidence
of past episodes of child abuse is logically relevant to the issue of whether
the defendant has been abusive on this occasion. Yet such evidence
is excluded because the fact finder is likely to conclude that one abuser
is like another, and to find liability regardless of whether the evidence
warrants such a determination this time. 11
The possibility of such prejudice is extremely high when a parent
is accused of causing harm to her own child, due to universal revulsion at the heinous nature of the offense. Instead of finding guilt based
on their feeling that a person with the defendant's other bad habits
is also a likely child abuser, the jury might reach a conclusion of guilt7 8
from the defendant's apparent similarity to other abusing parents. In
both cases, the character evidence rule operates to prevent such a conclusion of guilt based on the defendant's alleged propensity for bad
behavior.
The character evidence rule seems unequivocally to exclude the battering parent syndrome from evidence. Nonetheless, the courts appear
to rest exclusion only weakly on that foundation, by intimating that
a showing of its scientific accuracy might render the syndrome
admissible. 79 Since they cannot mean that scientifically accurate expert
testimony is exempted from the character evidence rule, so the courts
must be saying that if convinced of the ability of the battering parent
syndrome to identify accurately abusing parents, they would consider
fashioning an exception to the rule. 81
The immediate problem presented by this approach is that it con-

they would meet this test of prejudice because the information on reputation "appeals to the
biases or emotions of the fact-finder." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 156.
76. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 156.
77. Another statement of the issue is that a jury is less likely to feel regret at mistakenly
convicting an apparently unsavory defendant, so that they will scrutinize evidence far less carefully
for an "evil" than a "good" person. Lempert and Saltzburg describe this tendency in terms
of the mathematical model of a "regret matrix." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 162-65.
78. The same danger may attach to the parent of a child whose status is being adjudicated
by a judge in a child protection proceeding. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 22.
80. Despite the logical relevance of propensity evidence, the law classifies it as legally irrelevant. In the federal rules, this is accomplished by the inclusion of the character evidence rule
in the relevancy chapter. FED. R. Evrn. 404. The common law was more likely to state irrelevance
directly. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN. § 38-202 (1981 Rev.) ("The general character of the parties,
and especially their conduct in other transactions, are irrelevant matter . . . "). See generally
LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 152-55. Thus, Rule 404 and the other relevancy rules
control admissibility of all evidence, including testimony by experts. E.g., FED. R. Evrn. 702.
81. Otherwise, the language, "We feel this finding is required until further evidence of the
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flicts with the fundamental purpose of the character evidence rule, which
is concerned not with accuracy, but with prejudice. Increased scientific accuracy does not lessen the likelihood that a jury will convict
based on an impermissible inferenc~ that because of. her propensity,
the defendant must have committed the act charged. In effect, an exception to the character evidence rule for the battering parent syndrome
would determine that parents of allegedly abused children are not entitled to the same protection from jury prejudice as the law affords
other defendants. Assuming such a determination to be permissible, 82
it would give undue weight to the public policy of preventing child
abuse 83 at the expense of the rights of defendants. 84
IV.

COMPETING POLICIES: ANOTHER DETERRENT To CHILD ABUSE
OR THE PROTECTION OF FAIR ADJUDICATIONS?

Policy considerations supporting the interest of parents in an opportunity to defend adequately against a charge of child abuse argue
against an exception to the character evidence rule for the battering
parent syndrome. Part A of this final section examines the strong public
policy in favor of eradicating child abuse in the context of the several
exceptions to the traditional rules of evidence that the law has developed
in support of that policy. Part B argues that notwithstanding this admittedly powerful interest, permitting the battering parent syndrome
to override the character evidence rule in criminal cases would conflict
with the defendant parent's right to an adjudication of individual guilt.
This part further suggests that the quasi-criminal character of civil child
abuse adjudications likewise calls for exclusion of the battering parent
syndrome, and concludes that even in the absence of any due process
"right," the danger of a prejudicial decision should be sufficient to
bar the syndrome from evidence.

scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or profile diagnoses can be established," would
be meaningless. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). See also Sanders v. State,
251 Ga. 70, 302 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 17 n.4, 18 n.7 (1983); Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275,
279, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983).
82. It may be argued, especially in jurisdictions with codified rules of evidence, that any
judge-made exception to the character evidence rule would be usurpation of a legislative function. This argument fails to account for other judge-made evidence exceptions, such as the adoption from tort law of a rebuttable presumption of abuse in the presence of certain injuries. See
supra note 9; see also Principles, supra note 4. In addition, the activity of legislatures in the
area might imply either a desire to provide comprehensive statutory control over evidence in
child abuse cases, or legislative intent to facilitate prosecution of such cases. See infra. notes
120-122 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See infra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
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The Compelling Nature of the Public Policy of
Eradicating Child Abuse

It seems almost unnecessary to argue that American society supports
a strong public policy aimed at the prevention of child abuse, even
at the cost of parental "rights" and family "privacy." The law traditionally has declined to intervene in the private realm of family affairs, 85
and even protects many personal decisions about family life from the
paternalistic hand of the state's police power. 86 The cases of the United
States Supreme Court abound with statements supporting the rights
of parents to raise their children free from state regulation, 87 and our
85. For example, other than prescribing the rules of who may marry and under what circumstances parties may end their marriage, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, §§
201,203,204,205,207,208 and commissioner's prefatory note (1970), the law has abstained from
tinkering with the terms of the marriage contract; accordingly courts generally have declined to
enforce ante-nuptial agreements between the parties. E.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala.
1959) (refusing to enforce such an agreement in parental dispute about where a child should be
educated). But see Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (enforcing a reasonable
ante-nuptial agreement, made after full disclosur~ and limited to financial matters). In addition,
the common law declined to punish the husband for the "moderate correction" of his wife', though
concededly such conduct would have constituted a battery between non-family members. E.g., State
v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349,251 Terr. 454,456 (1868) (concluding that "family government is recognized
by Jaw as being as complete itself as the State government is in itself ... and that we will not
interfere or attempt to control it"). The law may seem inconsistent in prohibiting the parties from
exercising family autonomy in designing the terms of their marriage agreement, yet recognizing
"family autonomy" as a general principle excluding the law from family matters. This seeming
inconsistency may be explained by the legal fiction that family harmony will best be preserved
by removing the possibility of any litigation over most family disagreements.
86. Many of these principles may be summarized under the right of privacy, which prohibits
the state from most regulation of "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . ," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). While the
parameters of the right of privacy are unclear, the Supreme Court has prohibited the states from:
(I) making illegal the sale and use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1964); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1971); (2) requiring that all children
attend public schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924) (permitting parents
to send their children to Catholic schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1971)
(upholding the right of Amish parents, on religious and cultural grounds, to withdraw their children
from public schools prior to the minimum dropout age); and (3) zoning a neighborhood to prohibit an extended family from living together, Moore v. East Clevelan.d, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500
(1976). See generally, Note, Fornication, Cohabitation and the Constitution, or Lochner Redivivus,
77 MICH. L. REv. 252 (1978) (searching for the boundaries of the right of privacy).
87. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-233 (1971) ("The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children .... [Pierce] stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924) (upholding
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control . . . . The child is not the mere creature of the State."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 ("corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to
give his children education suitable to their station in life"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1943) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder ... [respecting] the private realm of family life which
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society generally accepts the physical disciplining of children as a corollary freedom. 88
Against this background, the scope of intervention into the family
authorized, 89 indeed required, 90 by state child protection statutes stands
in bright contrast. The vague standards for such intervention seem even
more remarkable. 91 The unique defenselessness of abused or neglected
children, whose presumed protectors are also perpetrators of harm,
has led even the federal government to appropriate funds for research
and the improvement of child protective services. 92 State legislatures
and courts have also attacked the problem by relaxing the rules of
evidence, lightening the state's burden of proof, especially in civil, but
also in criminal, proceedings. 93
More important as expressions of judicial policy, however, have been
the courts' extremely liberal interpretations of the existing exceptions
to the character evidence rule in child abuse prosecutions. Citing the
rule that evidence implicating character may be admitted to prove issues
other than propensity, courts have consistently refused to reverse convictions where the small probative value of character evidence to show,
for example, intent, seemed substantially outweighed by the possibilthe state cannot enter.") Indeed, courts have declined to order life-saving corrective surgery for
a child over parental objection. E.g., In Re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 92 Cal. App. 3d,
796 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
88. See, e.g., D. GIL, supra note I, at 8-17, 134-37.
89. See supra note 10.
90. See supra note I.
91. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.01 I (West 1978); see also supra note 10.
92. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5101 (1982)).
93. In the adjudication (fact-finding) phase of civil abuse and neglect proceedings, the New
York legislature has taken the lead in lightening the state's burden via the evidence provisions
of the New York Family Court Act of 1962 and its amendments. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, § 1046
(McKinney 1983). The act makes admissible past acts of parental abuse involving different children,
Id., § 1046(a)(i), and any mandatorily-reported past incident of abuse by the parent on file with
the state's central registry, Id. § 1046(a)(v), although both of these provisions would otherwise
conflict with the character evidence rule. Indeed, the practice commentary to the Act states that
character and background evidence is an "inextricable element in the proof" of a child abuse
adjudication. Id. § 1044 Practice Commentary. Hearsay statements of the child are also permitted, Id. § 1046(a)(vi). The Act also codifies a rebuttable presumption of abuse on the basis of
physical injuries such as "would not ordinarily· be sustained or exist except by reason of the
acts or omissions of the parent," id. § 1046(a)(ii), and makes evidence of drug or alcohol abuse
by the parent prima facie evidence of neglect, id. § 1046(a)(iii).
In the absence of codification, courts in other states have adopted one or more of the above
approaches, especially permitting the physical injuries described by the battered child syndrome
to create a prima facie case of abuse which the parent must then rebut. E.g., In Re Doege,
308 Minn. 104, 240 N.W.2d 562 (1976); Higgins v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d
745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). In addition, courts have liberally construed the parental unfitness
aspects of some child neglect definitions, e.g., In re Wachlin's 245 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1976)
(finding statutory "neglect" based on the parent's failure to cooperate to provide her child with
speech therapy); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10) (West 1982).
In homicide prosecutions arising out of parental abuse, courts have liberally construed rules
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ity that the jury would use the evidence as proof of propensity. 94 In
one case, for instance, the court permitted the prosecution to show
that the defendant had previously burned and beaten his child, resting
admissibility of the past acts of abuse on the grounds that they showed
the defendants "intent" and "design" to commit manslaughter of his
infant son. 95 The defense claimed that the danger of a jury reacting
prejudicially to such evidence and convicting on the basis of their emotional disgust with the defend ant substantially outweighed any probative value of the evidence on the permissible issue of intent. The
court dismissed this objection, citing seriatum the 404(b) exceptions
to the character evidence rule as authority for the proposition that the
previous acts were admissible to show the defendant's "predisposition"
to commit the crime charged. 96
Strong judicial language explicitly disallowing the battering parent
syndrome must thus be read in the light of this more general judicial
policy. Despite their current exclusion of the battering parent syndrome,
courts seem generally to view the concern for arresting child abuse as
more compelling than the prohibitions of the character evidence rule. 97
True, so far this policy has been implemented largely by discretionary

requiring that convictions based upon entirely circumstantial evidence must exclude "every other
reasonable hypothesis." See supra note 8.
94. While character evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity, the law traditionally has
permitted evidence of a party's past bad acts to prove matters other than propensity. E.g. FED.
R. Evrn. 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The comment to that rule notes that such an admission may be made only after meeting the
overriding test of rule 403, that its "probative value is [not] substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. Evrn. 403, 404(b), advisory committee's note.
95. State v. Vega, 40 N.C. App. 326, 253 S.E.2d 94, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 457, 256
S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).
96. State v. Vega, 40 N.C. App. 326, 253 S.E.2d 94, 97, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 457,
256 S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). Cf. Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 845
(Minn. 1981) (permitting testimony of prior beatings as "background," over a dissent arguing
that this is essentially battering parent syndrome evidence and ought to be excluded under Loebach,
310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981)); People v. Aeschlimann, 28 Cal. App. 3d 460, 473, 104 Cal. Rptr.
689, 697 (1972) (admitting testimony of prior abuse supporting a second degree murder conviction by asserting that the testimony was evidence of the same crime because the crime charged
included "a course of conduct of inflicting grievous pain and suffering").
97. Two reasons suggest themselves as explanations for courts' seeming inconsistency regarding admission of these two types of propensity evidence (the battering parent syndrome and past
acts of child abuse). First, courts may be wary of directly usurping the legislative function of
prescribing the rules of evidence. Admitting evidence of previous conduct may fit, however uncomfortably, into one of the explicit exceptions to the character evidence rule, such as proof
of "motive," "intent," or "design." See supra note 94. Admitting evidence of the battering
parent syndrome, on the other hand, would require an explicit exception to the rule. Further,
child abuse and neglect is not an area of legislative inaction, so any judicial act to create an
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interpretation of the codified exceptions to the rule, 98 and courts have
not attacked the rule directly. 99 Yet they also have intimated that the
rule may have limits: that science may some day replace character as
the active ingredient in the battering parent syndrome, thus rendering
it palatable to the judicial appetite. 100
Plainly, the law supports an unusually strong policy in favor of
eliminating child abuse and neglect. By necessity, the law of evidence
has responded to this policy by creating several exceptions aimed at
easing the state's evidentiary burden. To the extent that these exceptions aid in the protection of children without undermining the integrity
of the adjudicatory process itself, they are to be welcomed. The evidentiary problems of child abuse, however, do not justify eliminating those
procedural rules that protect defendants from a prejudicial determination of guilt. The creation of an additional exception, abrogating the
character evidence rule with respect to the battering parent syndrome,
would unjustifiably eliminate this important protection.

B.

Undesirability of an Exception to the Character Evidence Rule
for the Battering Parent Syndrome

Notwithstanding the compelliQg public policy against child abuse,
any need for an exception to the character evidence rule for the battering parent syndrome is outweighed by the law's interest in protecting
the right of parents to a fair adjudication.
Criminal Proceedings Against Abusing Parents: Individual Guilt
in the Due Process Model- Not surprisingly, the argument for an exception to the character evidence rule has arisen in the context of prosecutions for criminal child abuse. 101 Serious crimes engender serious
exception is more difficult to justify. Cf supra note 82. Yet, because court themselves have
suggested the possibility of future admissibility of the syndrome, judicial restraint does not explain their willingness to allow evidence of past abuse while excluding evidence of the battering
parent syndrome.
The second possible explanation has more force; intuitively if not legally. Courts are more
suspicious of predictions of future behavior than of evidence of previous conduct. The empirical
truth of this proposition may be deduced from the fact that courts permit the latter, but prohibit
the former. See supra note 94. In State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) the court
expressly noted its skepticism of the predictive power of psychology. Yet recognition that courts
view past episodes of abuse as more probative of propensity than a psychological profile ought
not to obscure the fact that the rule prohibits either form of character evidence from being admitted to proof the act in question. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a), (b).
98. See supra note 94.
99. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 18 (1983).
100. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 17 n.4, 18 n.7 (1983); State
v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981).
IOI. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) ("The state's position is that
the difficulties involved in prosecuting those who abuse children warrant an exception to the
general rule.").
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revulsion, and reasonable people feel little sympathy for child abusers.
Yet it is exactly for the protection of persons charged with especially
revolting crimes that our legal system embraces a due process model
of criminal procedure. 102 Especially when the initial evidence seems overwhelmingly to implicate a parent in the death of. her infant child, the
law surrounds her with a presumption of innocence, 103 and burdens
the state with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this particular
defendant committed the particular crime charged. 104 The character
evidence rule's concern with protecting the defendant from prejudice
addresses precisely this fundamental goal of the due process model. 105
Character evidence is excluded for fear "that the jury will convict a
defendant in order to penalize him for his past misdeeds, or simply
because he is an undesirable person." 106
However strong the state's need for evidence in an abuse prosecution, the alleged abusing parent ought to be entitled to the same adjudication of individual guilt as is any other criminal defendant. In
this context, what is most offensive about using the battering parent
syndrome to prove guilt is the suggestion of "corporate" guilt, arising
out of similarity to other abusing parents.
In the same way, the battering parent syndrome attacks the requirement that guilt attaches only to actual past acts or omissions, and not
to state of mind, however wicked. 10 ' To the extent it suggests that guilt
102. This label for the common law system of criminal justice, with its presumptions in favor
and protections of the defendant, is based on H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
103. Without exception, criminal courts recognize the common law presumption of innocence,
while acknowledging that the legislature may by statute substitute a limited presumption of guilt
in cases where a rational connection exists between defendants' behavior and the guilt presumed.
For example, in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 182-84 (1925) the Court held that
a statute forbidding concealment of opium with knowledge of its importation satisfied due process when posession was presumptive evidence of guilt. "Every accused person, of course, enters
upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence. But that presumption may be overcome, not only by direct proof, but ... by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative
presumption." Id. at 184-85. For such a legislative presumption to satisfy due process, "it is
only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed." Id. at 183; (quoting Mobile R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1910));
accord United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950); Michaelson v. United States, 266
U.S. 42, 66 (1924); City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 138-43, 203 N.W.2d 823, 829-32
(1972); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465,472, 160 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1968); State v. Deike, 143
Minn. 23, 172 N.W. 777 (1919). Professor Packer ties the presumption of innocence to the colloquial meaning of fairness, whose "simplest (if most neglected) meaning is that no one should
be subjected to punishment without having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his· culpability." H. PACKER, supra note 102, at 69.
104. The notion that criminal guilt is personal with the individual(s) charged is expressed
in the law's requirement of mens rea. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) (providing that no act is criminal unless committed purposely, knowingly, negligently or
recklessly).
105. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
106. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W. 2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981).
107. This requirement is reflected in part in our constitutional protection against ex post
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inheres in membership in a class of parents statistically likely to abuse
their children, proof of guilt by profile de-emphasizes the requirement
of conduct. Professor Packer summarizes the law's requirement of individual guilt for particular crimes thus:
[a]lthough it seeks to control the future by shaping the ways
in which people behave and by intervening in the lives of people who display anti-social propensities, the criminal law limits
its effect and its intervention to the locus poenitentiae [point
of no return] of what has in fact observably taken place in

the past. 108
Because even a highly accurate battering parent syndrome would suggest the parent's guilt only insofar as it showed propensity to abuse, 109
in a close case a jury's conviction might be based not on a statisfactory showing of the proscribed conduct, but on the jury's knowledge
of propensity. 110 Any inroads into the character evidence rule thus attack directly the requirement of individual guilt.
It may be argued that, as a pragmat~c matter, courts already admit
"character" evidence in child abuse proceedings, by admitting past
acts of abuse to prove matters other than propensity. 111 Juries seem
quite unlikely to heed an instruction that they consider the past acts
only on the issue of the defendant's intent to cause harm on this occasion, and not on the issue of general propensity to abuse. 112 The result
may be that the character evidence rule has already been abrogated
sub silentio by the courts, leaving no reason to continue excluding the
battering parent syndrome.
There are three problems with this argument. First even if a jury
disregards an instruction not to consider character evidence as proof
of propensity, they have at least heard the instruction. It is impossible
to estimate how salutory an effect such an instruction will have, but
surely it will influence some jurors. Second, to the extent that courts
are undermining the character evidence rule by admitting evidence of
past acts of abuse, they are operating outside the legitimate scope of
their authority. 1 1 3 The proper response to a small breach in the dike
is to plug it, not to tear down whatever protection remains.
facto laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
108. H. PACKER, supra note 102, at 96 (emphasis added).
109. See supra note 20.
I JO. In theory, the parent of an allegedly abused child is protected by the requirement of
sufficiency of the evidence. See supra note 59. In practice, however, courts have been quite liberal
in finding evidence sufficient in child abuse proceedings. See supra notes 6-7, 94.
111. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
I 12. See, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 214.
I 13. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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Finally, even if courts continue to interpret liberally the existing exceptions to the character evidence rule, such a limited actual displacement of the rule at least preserves an important theoretical principle:
legal criminal guilt may not arise merely from the lifestyles or ways
of thinking that characterize abusing parents. An explicit overriding
of the character evidence rule by the battering parent syndrome, tending as it does to show guilt by analogy, would undermine this notion
too substantially to be a tolerable rule.

B.

"Civil" Proceedings to Protect Endangered Children: Prejudice
in the Adjudication of Abuse

I. The Quasi-Criminal Character of Child Protection ProceedingsCourts and commentators agree that the fundamental purpose of the
rule excluding character evidence is to prevent a jury from penalizing
a defeIJ.dant because they perceive her to be a bad person. 114 The family
court's adjudication that a child is abused, of course, formally addresses no defendant and does not result in penal consequence to the
parent. Yet the significant punitive dimension to an adjudication of
abuse justifies treating the parent as a defendant, especially with regard
to the exclusion of propensity evidence under the character evidence rule.
While the proceeding may be directed only to determining whether
a child meets the statutory definition of abused, the parent of a child
so adjudged will be subjected to significant state intervention, including
potential termination of her parental rights and potential criminal prosecution. The law traditionally has accorded much deference to a parent's
right to guide the upbringing of her child; to secure that right against
unwarranted interference, child abuse proceedings generally prohibit
inquiry into parental "fitness" until after an independent finding that
the child is abused. Given the often difficult task of discriminating
between acceptable differences in parenting style and unlawful neglect
or abuse, 115 the law ought to secure the parent's interest that no mistake
occurs in the adjudication. The law should therefore treat the parent's
rights with the same care as if she were a defendant, inasmuch as this
can be accomplished consistent with the protective purpose of the
statutes. This is not to say that abuse adjudications ought to be subject to all the rules of criminal procedure. Clearly, the statutes embody an effort to protect endangered children, not to punish their
parents. Where the child's interest in protection from abuse meets the
parent's interest in retaining control, the statutes command that the
latter must yield.
114.
115.

See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
See generally D. GIL, supra note I, at 8-17, 134-37.
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In some areas, however, such legislative intent may conflict with overriding due process considerations. Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that states may not terminate parental rights except on a finding by
a jury of clear and convincing evidence of future danger to the child. 116
This Note makes no attempt to prove that the character evidence rule
is an element of constitutional due process in child abuse proceedings. 11 7
It does argue, however, that the place of the character evidence rule
in the due process model of criminal procedure so nearly touches the
abuse and neglect adjudication model that the law should rely on the
same considerations within both models to exclude the battering parent
syndrome from evidence.
2. Legislative Pre-Emption and the Danger of Prejudice- Although
the parent in an abuse adjudication occupies a position somewhat different from that of a criminal defendant, a significant parental interest
is at stake. 11 8 In addition, the exclusion mandated by the character
evidence rule applies no less to civil than to criminal proceedings. 119
For several reasons, character evidence in the form of the battering
parent syndrome should be inadmissible in abuse adjudications. First,
the child protection statutes permit an adjudication of abuse only on
the basis of particular kinds of parental fault. 120 While state legislatures
have authorized courts to examine the "immaturity" or "emotional
disability" of a parent, they have not authorized an inquiry into propensity to abuse. 121 Since the legislatures have spoken with particularity regarding which parent characteristics compose abuse, courts ought
not to expand the statutory definitions to include propensity to abuse.
Courts should consider themselves pre-empted from considering such
evidence at the adjudication phase of a proceeding. 122
Second, admission of evidence about the battering parent syndrome
may direct the decisionmaker's thoughts from adjudication of abuse
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
117. Yet if the character evidence rule exists to ensure that defendants receive a fair adjudication of their individual guilt, see supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text, the rule
may be thought to have its foundations in constitutional due process. To that extent, the substantial
punitive dimension of child protection proceedings may likewise require a constitutional analysis.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the mere fact that a judicial proceeding carries with it
no formal criminal punishment does not mean that the constitution may not require more substantial
due process protections in some civil proceedings where substantial parental interests are involved.
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-34 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982).
I 18. E.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (finding that parent's
right to " 'companionship, care, custody, and management' of [a child] is an important interest
that 'undeniably warrants deference'") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 631 (1972)).
119. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ !IOI (West 1980) (stating that the rules of evidence apply
to "all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state").
120. See supra notes 10, 52.
121. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (10) (West 1978). See also supra notes 10, 52.
122. This rule should not apply at the dispositional phase of the proceeding, where otherwise

678

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:3

to assessment of custody alternatives. Although abuse and placement
decisions are made separately, and most jurisdictions provide for the
adjudication of abuse by a judge rather than a jury, 123 concerns about
prejudice remain. Lay testimony offered to support a battering parent
profile might reveal particularly unappealing aspects of the parent's
personality, subjecting even an experienced family court judge to the
danger of prejudice. 124 The danger is not the expert presentation of
characteristics of typical abusing parents, since such information would
likely be superfluous to a judge with experience in child protection
proceedings. The danger rather is that in shifting the focus of the inquiry from whether the child has been abused to the characteristics
of the parent, the judge may be making the decision about best custody
placement that the legislature deliberately deferred to the dispositional
phase of the proceeding. The more evidence on the "unfitness" of
the parent that arises through lay witness's discussion of her poor impulse control or low empathy, the more likely the judge is to base the
conclusion that abuse has occurred on these "unfitness" criteria, rather
than on the criteria specified in the statutes. 125 Since an expert's recitation of the characteristics of typical abusive parents may be assumed
to be superfluous to an experienced judge, the danger of corroborative
lay testimony prejudicing the judge against the parent surely "substantially outweighs" the probative value of such testimony.
Thus, despite the latitude permitted family courts to conduct child
protection proceedings "in an informal manner," 126 family court judges
ought not to permit the state to prove that a parent fits the battering
parent syndrome at the adjudication phase of the proceeding. The parental interests at stake are too great, and the helpfulness of such
testimony too small thus to contravene the two-step proceeding contemplated in the statutory child protection scheme.
CONCLUSION

The substantial difficulty of proof in legal proceedings involving child
abuse undoubtedly requires the legal system to take extraordinary
measures to enable the state effectively to protect children from parental

inadmissible evidence is allowed by statute. See supra note 67.
123. As of 1975, only twelve jurisdictions provided parents with a right to jury trial in child
protection proceedings. Katz, Child Neglect Law in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. I, 32-33 (1975).
124. While an inexperienced judge might find information on typical battering parents useful
as background, such a judge would be more subject to the danger of prejudice.
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015 (6), (10) (West 1978).
126. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 200.155(1) (West 1978).
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abuse. 121 Despite the responsiveness of courts and legislatures, the problem persists. Although permitting the state to show the parent's similarity to the battering parent profile may ease the state's burden in proving abuse, courts have correctly identified the procedure as proof by
propensity, and have excluded it under the character evidence rule.
Whatever the scientific accuracy of the battering parent syndrome,
courts should continue to exclude it under the character evidence rule.
The case for exclusion is most compelling in criminal proceedings, where
permitting profile evidence to suggest an inference of guilt would undermine the defendant's due process right to a determination of individual
guilt. Yet the significant punitive dimension that accompanies the
deprivation of custody of a child argues almost as forcefully that similar•
protection ought to be afforded the parent whose child is alleged, under
the child protection laws, to have been abused or neglected. Resting
proof of child abuse on the psychological profile of typical abusing
parents injures too severely the notion of individual guilt to be a prudent solution.

Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr.

127. In addition to the criminal and civil abuse proceedings discussed in this Note, the legal
system could aid the cause of eradicating child abuse by fostering such currently extra-legal organizations as Parents Anonymous. See generally Lieber, Parent's Anonymous: A New Direction Against
Child Abuse, in NAT. COMM. FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CHILD ABUSE: PRESENT AND
FUTURE 53 (1975); Pike, Professionals Are Not the Only Answer, in id. at 215. There would
appear to be no impediment to a family court judge ordering participation in such a self-help
group as an alternative to traditional counseling or foster care.

